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MARITAL RIGHTS UNDER THE MISSOURI
PROBATE CODE OF 1955*
DAVID Y. CAMPBELLt
INTRODUCTION
Missouri law dealing with property rights of one spouse in the
estate of the other has undergone marked changes as 'a result of the
enactment of the Probate Code of 1955.1 This article does not purport
to be a treatise on the law of marital rights, but rather, its purpose
is simply to outline and discuss questions concerning the application
of the new code which are likely to arise in everyday practice. Ac-
cordingly, case citations are illustrative, and do not represent more
than a fraction of the numerous decisions of Missouri appellate courts
dealing with the particular points discussed.2 All marital rights dealt
with in this article are of statutory origin.
I. STATUTORY RIGHTS
A. Property Rights of One Spouse in the Estate of the Other Prior to
the Probate Code of 1955
Prior to the effective date of the present Probate Code, a surviving
spouse inherited if there were no lineal descendants and no father,
mother, brother or sister, or their descendants.3 The surviving spouse
also had certain statutory rights, including allowances for one year's
support, absolute property, and certain of the tangible and household
possessions4
In addition, a surviving spouse had dower rights,5 in both real and
personal property, the quantum of which depended upon whether
there were any children born of the marriage, whether there were any
children by a prior marriage, and in some small degree, whether the
* This paper was originally presented on February 6, 1960, at Washington
University, as part of the Continuing Legal Education Program under the co-
sponsorship of the Bar Association of St. Louis and the Washington University
School of Law.
t Partner, Stamm, Millar, Neuhoff & Campbell.
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 472.010-475.480 (Supp. 1957). The effective date of the
new Missouri Probate Code was January 1, 1956. All statutory references in the
text are to Missouri Revised Statutes.
2. For a more exhaustive treatment of the field of marital rights law, see 4
Maus, Missouri Practice 1171-1220 (1960).
3. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 468.010 (1949) (repealed).
4. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 462.450 and 462.460 (1949) (both repealed).
5. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 469.010-469.130 (1949) (repealed).
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surviving spouse was the husband or the wife. A right of election
could be exercised in lieu of dower. However, these dower sections
were repealed by the Probate ICode of 1955, 6 and consequently, today,
dower has only historical significance with respect to current prob-
lems which may arise regarding property rights of the husband and
wife.
In enacting the Probate Code of 1955, the 68th General Assembly
repealed, in addition to the dower sections mentioned above, virtually
all of the then existing statutes relating to administration of dece-
dents' estates. Further, the new Code expressly abolished curtesy
and dower, except as to estates vested prior to January 1, 1956.T
The widow's homestead interest met a similar fate. Under the old
homestead law,8 the widow and minor children were vested with a
homestead estate, consisting of the right of occupancy during widow-
hood and minority. When the heirs were children, homestead was not
subject to sale for debts of the deceased, hnless legally charged during
his lifetime, and sale on an administrator's deed under order of the
Probate Court, has been held absolutely void and ineffective to pass
title.' But a sale to pay the widow's support allowance has been held
valid, although subject to her homestead rights.-o And, when the heirs
were other than children, homestead could be sold to pay debts, again
however, subject to the widow's rights.
In 1955, homestead was rendered nugatory by the Probate Code,12
and in 1957 it was expressly repealed by the 69th General Assembly.22
The only present importance of dower and homestead is in connection
with real estate titles, vested prior to January 1, 1956, which are
affected by either dower or homestead.
B. Rights Under the Probate Code of 1955
Right of Inheritance
The new Code, while abolishing dower and homestead,"-1 substitutes
new rights in lieu thereof. For example, the surviving spouse is made
a primary heir-at-law under the new statute of descent, which pro-
vides that the surviving spouse is an heir-at-law, receiving one-half
6. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.110 (Supp. 1957).
7. Ibid.
8. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.495 (1949) (repealed).
9. Kay v. Politte, 344 Mo. 805, 129 S.W.2d 863 (1939).
10. Rodewald v. Rodewald, 297 S.W.2d 536 (Mo. 1957).
11. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.290 (Supp. 1957).
12. Mo. Laws 1957, § 1 at 292.
13. Note 11 supra.
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of the real and personal property if there are descendants, or father,
mother, brother or sister, or their descendants; otherwise, the surviv-
ing spouse receives the entire estate as sole heir-at-law."
The Right of Election
Under the former law, election was a statutory right pertaining to
real estate which offered to the surviving spouse the right to choose a
statutory share in lieu of dower. When a will was involved, it was
necessary for the surviving spouse to make a formal renunciation
thereof, in addition to executing the declaration of election. The
present right of election is equivalent to equitable election under the
old law. It includes a renunciation of the will, and no distinction is
made between real and personal property. The right of election is
the right to elect to take against the will. If the right is exercised, the
surviving spouse takes by descent. If there are children, the surviving
spouse's share is one-third, otherwise the share is one-half.
A question arises as to the effect of the provision that the electing
spouse takes one-half if there are no lineal descendants. It is to be
noted that the statute does not say that if there are no lineal descen-
dants but there is a father, mother, brother or sister or their descen-
dants, the electing spouse takes one-half. Therefore, if the statute is
to be construed literally, a testator, whose only heir-at-law would be
the surviving spouse, could deprive the surviving spouse of the right
of inheritance to the extent of one-half, by making a will in which all
or at least one-half of the estate is left to a stranger, or to a charity.
The form of election is prescribed in the statute.' The right is
personal to the spouse, 7 and is not subject to change except for fraud
or mistake18 Election must be made within ten days after the time
for contesting the will, or, if there is then pending litigation as to the
validity or construction of the will, or litigaton which would affect the
amount of the spouse's share, or litigation to determine whether or
not there was issue, the time for the election is extended to ninety days
after the final determination of such litigation.2"
One effect of an election 20 is that the spouse takes by descent and
takes nothing under the will, and any remainders after a life estate
to the surviving spouse are accelerated, unless the will otherwise
14. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.010 (1) (Supp. 1957).
15. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
16. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.190 (Supp. 1957).
17. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.200 (Supp. 1957).
18. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.210 (Supp. 1957).
19. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.180 (Supp. 1957).
20. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
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provides. Existing law under the cases is that the reduction of the
estate affects all beneficiaries equally.2 1
It should be noted that the right of election may be waived,2 and
that a failure to elect does not affect the spouse's rights in intestate
property or the several allowances. 23
Statutory Alowances
The statutory allowances 2 -- exempt property, support, and home-
stead-all have priority over creditors' rights. Exempt property s in-
cludes all household goods, clothing, and the like, without limit as to
amount, but it does not include automobiles and jewelry, and probably
not art objects, although there is a division of opinion as to the latter.
The 1955 Code provides for a family allowance, 2 which is equiva-
lent to the old year's support allowance. The principal difference be-
tween the twyois that the right to the family allowance is given to the
surviving spouse and the unmarried minor children. The allowance is
payable to the surviving spouse, for the use of the surviving spouse
and the unmarried minor children, unless the court finds that it
would be just and equitable to -make a division thereof. If there is no
surviving spouse, the allowance is payable to the guardian or other
person having the care and custody of any unmarried minor children.
The difference just noted may have some effect upon the availability
of the allowance as a part of the marital deduction under the Federal
Estate Tax, to be referred to later.
The new homestead allowance 27 is entirely novel, and has no relation
whatsoever to the right of homestead prior to January 1, 1956. The
present homestead allowance fs measured in a sum of money, not to
exceed $7,500 or one-half the real and personal property in the estate,
after deduction of the exempt property and the family allowance,
whichever amount shall be the lesser. The homestead allowance is
offset against the spouse's distributive share. It is the consensus that
this would not apply where the spouse has only an equitable life estate.
The allowance may be taken in specific property, real or personal.
21. Lilly v. Menke, 143 Mo. 137, 44 S.W. 730 (1898). But see Barksdale v.
Morris, 361 Mo. 432, 235 S.W.2d 288 (1950), where a different result was ob-
tained on the theory that the contingent remainder after the remainder interest
in the husband, was alternative.
22. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.220 (Supp.'1957).
23. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.230 (Supp. 1957).
24. See Hensley, Exempt Property, Family Allowance, Homestead and Election
to Take Against the Will, in Missouri Estate Administration 249 (Mo. Bar CLE
1960).
25. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.250 (Supp. 1957).
26. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.260 (Supp. 1957).
27. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.290 (Sulp. 1957).
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A practical problem arises when a surviving spouse chooses specific
property valued in excess of the amount of the allowance.
Until recently, a question also existed as to whether a spouse
electing against the will was entitled to the homestead allowance. Two
1959 decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court, construing the new
homestead section 28 in light of the right of election, have held that the
electing spouse is entitled to homestead allowance as well as to the
exempt property and support allowances. 29 This point is almost moot
now by reason of 1957 amendments concerning the right of election3o
However, the cases also deal with the problem which arises when the
spouse selects real estate in satisfaction of the homestead allowance,
the value of which exceeds such allowance. In such a case, the spouse
pays the difference to the estate . 3  However, the supreme court held
erroneous a decree authorizing an administratrix's deed conveying
real estate in satisfaction of the homestead allowance, subject to a lien
in favor of the other heir in such sum as the latter would be entitled to
receive on final settlement of the estate.3 2
While the family allowance or allowances for exempt property need
not be applied for within any specific time limit, the homestead allow-
ance is deemed waived unless applied for within ten days after the
lapse of the period of non-claim. The homestead allowance is stated
to be in lieu of all dower and homestead rights in the property of a
decedent. However, there is express provision- s that no right of home-
stead which vested in the surviving spouse or minor children of a
decedent prior to January 1, 1956, is affected.
The Probate Code of 195534 deals with the effect of a surviving
spouse's death on family and homestead allowances. It provides that
no allowance for the maintenance of a surviving spouse can be made
for any period after his or her death. This provision seriously impairs
the qualification of the family allowance for support, as a part of the
estate tax marital deduction. In that connection, the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled35 in an unpublished ruling, that the family allowance
is a terminable interest in view of the language contained in Section
28. Ibid.
29. Owen v. Riffle, 323 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1959); In re Estate of Bell, 328
S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1959).
30. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
31. Owen v. Riffle, 323 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1959), where the trial court so decreed
and the supreme court affirmed; In re Estate of Bell, 328 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. 1959),
where the supreme court so ordered on appeal.
32. Walton v. Walton, 330 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1960).
33. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.290 (Supp. 1957).
34. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.300 (Supp. 1957).
35. This ruling notes Hensley, Recent Developments of Rights of Surviving
Spouse, 15 Mo. B.J. 168 (1959).
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474.300. This section provides that the homestead allowance, on a
surviving spouse's death, goes to the unmarried minor children. If,
however, there are no unmarried minor children, the right to the
allowance does not revert to the estate of the deceased spouse.3,
It was held under the former law that the right of a surviving
spouse to a year's support allowance vested immediately upon the
death of the first spouse, and was enforceable after the surviving
spouse's death by the latter's personal representative.37 The right to
the family allowance is probably also vested,38 but it may be defeated
under Section 474.300, for practical purposes, by the death of the
second spouse immediately after the death of the first spouse. In any
event, the amount of the family allowance may be materially reduced
if the surviving spouse dies within a year after the death of the first
spouse, and prior to the making of the allowance and the payment
thereof. The unanswered questions arise when the allowance has been
made in a lump sum, and the order has become a final judgment, but
the surviving spouse dies within the year before the allowance is
actually paid. The same problem arises when the surviving spouse
dies within the year, after the allowance has been made and paid in a
lump sum. In such case, it is unsettled as to whether the estate of the
second spouse is liable to a refund of any part of the allowance to the
estate of the first spouse dying. In the author's opinion there is no
liability to refund in such Case.39
There are several other sections of the statute, which may be
grouped under a miscellaneous heading, which either implement the
marital rights already mentioned, or which contain additional rights
which are of importance to the surviving spouse.
Refusal of letters testamentary, based on the exempt property and
support allowances, small estates, and transfers without administra-
tion,4 0 are also dealt with in the new Probate Code. These sections
are c6mplete and self-explanatory and will receive no further com-
ment here.
As under the former law, the surviving spouse is granted the first
right to administer, in the absence of a will.'1
One other provision of the Code provides a new right for the spouse,
and although not specifically limited to spouses, should be mentioned.' 2
This section provides for a discharge, by the estate of the deceased
36. Schubel v. Bonacker, 331 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1960).
37. Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo. App. 91, 89 S.W.2d 153 (1936).
38. Hensley, supra note 35, at 170.
39. This opinion is shared by Judge Hensley, ibid.
40. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 473.090-473.107 (Supp. 1957).
41. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.110 (Supp. 1957).
42. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.290 (Supp. 1957).
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spouse, of a lien on another's property to secure the deceased's debt.
This would include payment by the deceased's estate of a loan against
a life insurance policy, payable to the surviving spouse, or the dis-
charge of a deed of trust or other lien against entirety property.4 '
II. BARRING OR LIMITING M ARITAL RIGHTS
Statutory Provisions
Divorce destroys the several marital rights heretofore mentioned
which are granted to the "surviving spouse," that is, exempt prop-
erty," family allowance, ' homestead allowance, 46 the right of election
to take against the will," and the right of inheritance. ' s This is a dis-
tinct departure from the former law, which permitted a wife who
obtained a divorce for the fault of the husband to retain her inchoate
dower. Under the provisions of the new Code, 4 a divorce has the
effect of revoking the provisions of a testator's will in favor of the
divorced surviving spouse, and the effect is as though the divorced
spouse had predeceased the testator. The statute makes no distinction
with respect to which of the divorced parties was at fault.
Iere separation, absent divorce, does not affect marital rights.
However, the right of inheritance and rights to the several allowances,
may be barred by commission of any of the following acts of miscon-
duct: (1) voluntarily leaving the spouse and continuing with an
adulterer; (2) deserting for one year; (3) living in a continuous state
of adultery; (4) and, if a wife, having been ravished, consenting to
the ravisher. Reconciliation and resumption of cohabitation avoids
the statutory bar.50
Ante-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements
The "femme sole" statute,- makes possible agreements between a
husband and a wife. Another section 5' provides for ante-nuptial
agreements by way of jointure. It provides that the property received,
or to be received at the other spouse's death, must be a provision for
support for life, and it must be expressly conveyed or given in full
43. See Committee Comment in annotation following Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.290
(Supp. 1957).
44. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.250 (Supp. 1957).
45. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.260 (Supp. 1957).
46. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.290 (Supp. 1957).
47. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
48. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.010 (Supp. 1957).
49. Mo. Rev. Stat § 474.420 (Supp. 1957).
50. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.140 (Supp. 1957).
51. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.290 (1949).
52. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.120 (Supp. 1957).
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discharge of all rights of inheritance or other statutory rights. The
section states in part that "If any person prior to and in contemplation
of marriage, in agreement or marriage contract with his intended
spouse, or other person, receives any estate.., such estate shall be
valid... .-53 The phrase "or other person" may mean that a parent,
for example, can contract with a prospective daughter-in-law or son-
in-law to bar rights of inheritance or other statutory rights in the
prospective estate of the parent's child.
The new Code further provides, that if a conveyance or contract in
lieu of rights fails as a legal bar, and the rights are thereafter de-
manded, the estate and interest so conveyed, determines.5' Past deci-
sions of the appellate courts, however, indicate that the effect of the
latter section may be more illusory than real, for seldom, if ever, has
the surviving spouse (usually the widow, in the cases) been required
to refund or reconvey.
The rights of election to take against the will may be waived either
before or after marriage by written agreement, after full disclosure
of the particular spouse's property, if the consideration is fair under
all the circumstances. s
Neither Section 474.120 nor Section 474.220 appears to change the
existing case law on the requirements of valid agreements between
husband and wife. In fact, the latter section expressly incorporates
the language usually used by the cases in testing the validity of such
agreements.
Ante-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements have long been upheld
when they meet the tests of: (1) full disclosure; (2) adequate con-
sideration; (3) unequivocality; (4) fairness, reasonableness and just
nature.56 Formerly, however, anti-nuptial agreements did not bar
dower, unless they were in strict accord with the old statute on the
subject ;57 but statutory rights to allowances were not within the
former jointure statute. Post-nuptial arrangements, in the nature of
separation agreements, usually have been upheld.5'
The leading case on post-nuptial agreements entered into in con-
templation of separation and divorce is North v. North.'D In that
case, the parties had entered into a property settlement agreement in
53. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
54. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.130 (Supp. 1957).
55. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.220 (Supp. 1957).
56. Jones v. McGonigle, 327 Mo. 457, 37 S.W.2d 892 (1931); In re Wood's
Estate, 288 Mo. 588, 232 S.W. 671 (1921).
57. Broyles v. Magee, 71 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
58. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936); Chapman v. Corbih,
316 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Clark v. Clark, 228 S.W.2d 828 (MIo. Ct.
App. 1950); Hall v. Greenwell, 231 Mo. App. 1093, 85 S.W.2d 150 (1935).
59. North v. North, supra note 58.
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anticipation of the filing of the divorce petition, whereby, in consid-
eration of the wife's releasing her claim to support and alimony, the
husband agreed to pay her the sum of $500 per month until her death
or remarriage, and the wife further agreed, in the event of her obtain-
ing a divorce, to release her dower rights in his property. The wife
obtained a divorce for the husband's fault, and the decree of the trial
court awarded her $500 per month until her death or remarriage. On
the husband's subsequent motion to modify, the supreme court held
that the trial court's divorce decree was not a decree of alimony but
was a decree embodying the contractual provisions of the post-nuptial
contract agreement, since the court would have no power to decree ali-
mony beyond the death of the husband. The court futher observed
that:
The law is too well settled in this state to admit of dispute that
husband and wife, in contemplation of a separation and divorce,
may, by a valid contract between themselves, settle and adjust
all property rights growing out of the marital relation, including
the wife's right of dower and claim for alimony, support, and
maintenance.'*
The court also held that the wife's relinquishment of the husband's
legal duty to support her during marriage and to provide for her sup-
port and maintenance in case of a separation and divorce, together
with a release of her dower rights, constituted adequate consideration
for the husband's agreements to pay her $500 per month, even after
the death of the husband.
Generally, however, for a variety of reasons, ante-nuptial contracts
have not been sustained in cases reaching the appellate level. An
ante-nuptial contract has been held invalid for failure of the husband
to make a full disclosure of his property to the wife. 1 Where the con-
tract failed to spell out any specific bar of rights, it was held to be the
basis for a claim against the deceased husband's estate for payment
of a sum of money, in addition to the dower and other marital rights.
2
Other cases have refused to sustain such contracts where the contract
was equivocal and was lacking in consideration ;63 where the provision
for the wife was so inadequate as to raise a presumption of fraud and
concealment;' 4 and where there was a lack of consideration. 5
60. Id. at 1230, 100 S.W.2d at 584.
61. Mathis v. Crane, 360 Mo. 631, 230 S.W.2d 707 (1950).
62. Broyles v. Magee, 71 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
63. In re Wood's Estate, 288 Mo. 588, 232 S.W.2d 671 (1921).
64. Jones v. McGonigle, 327 Mo. 457, 37 S.W.2d 892 (1931).
65. Rudd v. Rudd, 318 Mo. 935, 2 S.W.2d 585 (1927).
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The following quotation from Jones v. McGonigle"6 exemplifies how
closely courts will scrutinize a contract between a husband and wife
to test its validity:
The following may be said to be well settled rules applicable to
antenuptial contracts: that the relation existing between a man
and the woman whom he is engaged to marry is a confidential
one in "an exact and stringent sense" (Donaldson v. Donaldson,
249 Mo. 228) ; that good faith is the cardinal principle in such
transactions, making it incumbent upon the prospective husband
to fully inform his prospective wife, with respect to the nature
and extent of his estate (30 C.J. 643) ; that such contract must
be clearly understood by the wife, be just and reasonable and free
from concealment. As to whether the contract is just and reason-
able, courts of equity will take into consideration the adequacy of
the provision for the wife. [30 C.J. 642.] Ordinarily, inadequacy
raises a presumption of fraud and concealment, throwing the
burden of proving the absence of fraud and concealment upon the
husband or those claiming under him (30 C.J. 644), and the con-
tract and all circumstances attending its execution will be "re-
garded with the most rigid scrutiny" by courts of equity. [Carr
v. Lackland, 112 Mo. 1. c. 442; Egger v. Egger, 225 Mo. 116;
13 R.C.L. 1374.167
Summing up, it is legally possible to bar inheritance and other
marital rights, including the right of election, by either ante-nuptial
or post-nuptial contracts, if the following requirements are strictly
observed, particularly by the husband: (1) there must be a full and
complete disclosure of the spouse's property; (2) there must be
adequate provision for the other spouse, or at least a real considera-
tion which is fair under all the circumstances; (3) the contract must
be explicit as to the rights to be barred; (4) the contract must be
reasonable and just; and (5) particularly as to the wife, the legal
effect of the contract must be understood.
Joint and Mutual Wills
It is also possible, by means of a contract to make a joint or mutual
will irrevocable; to limit the disposition of an estate by the surviving
spouse.68 Parol evidence is admissible to show the agreement not to
revoke.6 9 An oral contract to make a joint or mutual will, however,
requires a high degree of proof.70
Such a method of control of ultimate disposition of property is not
66. Jones v. McGonigle, 327 Mo. 457, 37 S.W.2d 892 (1931).
67. Id. at 464, 37 S.W.2d at 894.
68. Glueck v. McMehen, 318 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
69. Ibid.
70. In re Opel's Estate, 352 Mo. 592, 179 S.W.2d 1 (1944).
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recommended because of the complete inflexibility of the testament,
which may become very outmoded during the lifetime of the second
spouse. At the death of the first spouse, the joint will is fixed, and
cannot be changed later in any respect.
III. PARTICULAR RIGHTS AND ACTIONS
Torts Against Property
By reason of the "femme sole" statute1 already referred to, one
spouse can sue the other as to property torts,2 but not as to personal
torts.7 2
In a recent divorce case, the question raised was whether the
defendant wife was entitled to sue for an accounting of joint funds
and joint personal property allegedly converted by the plaintiff hus-
band. The court held that the conversion involved a disavowal of the
joint ownership, so that the accounting prior to the divorce was
proper.7'
Resulting Trusts
It is theoretically possible, although practically difficult, for a
husband to establish sole ownership of property by way of a resulting
trust, where the property has been purchased by him and conveyed to
his wife in her name alone, or to himself and his wife as tenants by
the entirety. A recent decision of the supreme court 5 demonstrates
the extreme difficulty encountered by a husband in successfully main-
taining such an action. The opinion lays down the requirements that
the husband must prove that he paid the whole purchase price out of
his separate funds; and he must also prove, by evidence sufficient to
rebut the very strong presumption of a gift, that he did not intend to
make a gift or provision for his wife. To state the last requirement is
to emphasize the husband's small hope of success. Moreover, if the
wife be dead, the husband's lips are sealed by the "Dead Man's
Statute."" Otherwise, parol evidence is admissibleY7
Transfers in Fraud of Marital Rights
The principle is well settled that an action by one spouse will lie to
set aside a transfer by the other spouse in fraud of the former's
71. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.290 (1949).
72. Smith v. Smith, 300 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
73. Deatherage v. Deatherage, 328 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1959); Brawner v.
Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).
74. Ray v. Ray, 336 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
75. Hampton v. Niehaus, 329 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1959).
76. Sutorius v. Mayor, 350 Mo. 1235, 170 S.W.2d 387 (1943).
77. Hampton v. Niehaus, 329 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1959).
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marital rights.7 Usually such an action is brought by the wife against
the husband's estate or his heirs. The fraudulent transfer complained
of can take place either before or during marriage.
In Breshears v. Breshears" the husband, on the eve of his marriage
to plaintiff, deeded his property to his children by a former marriage,
reserving a life estate. Evidence indicated that the conveyance vir-
tually stripped the husband of property available for support of his
wife, that the conveyance was made in direct anticipation of the
marriage, and that the conveyance was concealed from the wife. The
court held that the conveyance was invalid as to the wife, and set it
aside to that extent, so that the grantee's title was subject to the wife's
marital rights.
In Merz -v. Tower Grove Bank & Trust Company,8 the husband,
during the marriage, conveyed the great bulk of his property by an
intef vivos trust, under the terms of which the wife's interest was
considerably less than that to which she would have been entitled
under the statute, had the property been included in the husband's
estate at his death. The inter vivos transfer occurred when the hus-
band, advanced in years, and in ill health, knew that his death was
imminent. The evidence further showed that the purpose of the inter
vivos trust was to deprive and defraud the wife of her marital rights.
The petition alleged the invalidity of the transfer, not only because it
was in fraud of the wife's marital rights, but because the inter vivos
trust was testamentary in character. The court held for the plaintiff,
and set the entire trust aside, finding that the trustee was a partici-
pant in the fraud on the wife. Further, the conveyance of property by
a husband in contemplation of death, without consideration, and with
the intent and purpose of defeating the wife's marital rights, was a
fraud on the wife. Finally, the court further declined to allow any
deductions for trustee's commissions or for attorney's fees or expenses
of the trustee, and ordered the trust estate transferred, one-half to
the plaintiff widow, and the other half to the executors of the deceased
husband's estate.
In Wanstrath v. Kappel," an action by the widow to set aside an
inter vivos trust created by the husband, without consideration, while
he was conscious of his impending death, the court set aside the trust
as to the widow, and decreed that she was entitled to a child's share
of one-third, subject to one-third of the taxes and the allowed claims.
78. Breshears v. Breshears, 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (1950); Wanstrath
v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947); Merz v. Tower Grove Bank &
Trust Co., 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939).
79. 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (1950).
80. 344 Mo. 1150, 130 S.W.2d 611 (1939).
81. 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W.2d 327 (1947).
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Evidence showed that the purpose of the trust, which included almost
all of husband-grantor's property, was to deprive the wife of her
statutory rights. In the second Wanstrath case,82 involving the same
parties in another phase of the same action, the court held that the
widow's share of the trust to which she was entitled under the first
holding was not subject to trustee's commissions, attorney's fees,
guardian ad litem fees or other costs of the litigation.
However, not every transfer by the husband, which deprives the
wife or widow of her marital rights, may be set aside. In the early
case, of Hornsey v. Casey,8" plaintiff had obtained a divorce from the
deceased husband for his fault, and therefore retained her inchoate
dower interest. Subsequent to the divorce, the husband conveyed real
estate of which he had been seized during the marriage. At his death,
the divorced wife filed her election to take one-half of the real and
personal estate on hand at the time of her former husband's death,
in lieu of dower. She also brought an action to set aside the transfer
by the husband as being in fraud of her dower right. The supreme
court held that a divorced wife who had retained her inchoate dower
has the right of election in lieu of dower, which is limited to one-half
of the real and personal estate on hand at the husband's death; but
that she could not set aside a conveyance after the divorce, as being in
fraud of her right of election. The court further held the election was
irrevocable, and dower in the conveyed property was lost. Had the
plaintiff not made her election she would have had dower, because
dower attaches to any property owned during coverture.
Another case, 8' decided in 1955, illustrates the necessity of meeting
the various elements of proof. The husband, during coverture, had
created an inter vivos trust into which he placed almost his entire
property. The provisions of the trust were highly restrictive as to the
wife, and gave her far less than she would have been entitled to under
the statute, had there not been such a conveyance. Evidence showed
that the purpose and effect of the conveyance was to deprive the wife
of her marital rights, althought there was some evidence that there
might have been another business reason for the creation of the trust.
The supreme court, however, in refusing to set aside the transfer in
an action by the wife, based its holding upon the ground that there
was no evidence that the transfer had been made in contemplation or
in anticipation of death. However, a different result might have been
reached had the case arisen under the Probate Code of 1955.85
82. Wanstrath v. Kappel, 358 Mo. 1077, 218 S.W.2d 618 (Mo. 1949).
83. 21 Mo. 545 (1855).
84. Potter v. Winter, 280 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1955).
85. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.150 (Supp. 1957).
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While most of the cases have been actions by the wife or her heirs
to set aside allegedly fradulent transfers, it is clear that a husband or
his heirs may also bring such a suit.As The supreme court's opinion
in Breshears v. Breshears,81 is illustrative of this point:
However, a voluntary conveyance, one in consideration of love
and affection, yields where it constitutes a fraud upon creditors
or a widow's marital rights. (Citing cases) A couple to be
married in the future stand [sic] in a confidential relationship
after the agreement of betrothal. (Citing authorities) With the
parties betrothed and occupying a fiduciary relationship of the
strictest confidence, and with no valuable consideration passing
from the grantees to the grantor, as here; and with the con-
veyance stripping the husband of his property and ability to meet
obligations contemplated by law for the protection of his widow,
the burden of going forward with the evidence to sustain the
transfer shifted to the grantor husband and his representatives.
(Citing authorities) 8
The new Probate Code of 1955,11 as amended in 1957, appears to
codify the existing case law.90 Paragraph 1 of section 474.150 merely
states the existing case law. Paragraph 2 of the section creates a
presumption where there is a conveyance of real estate. Paragraph 3,
86. Hastings v. Hudson, 359 Mo. 912, 224 S.W.2d 945 (1949).
87. 360 Mo. 1057, 232 S.W.2d 460 (1950).
88. Id. at 1065, 232 S:W.2d at 462-63.
89. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.150 (Supp. 1957) provides:
Gifts in fraud of marital rights-presumptions on conveyances-
1. Any gift made by a person, whether dying testate or intestate, in
fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse to share in his
estate, shall, at the election of the surviving spouse, be treated as a
testamentary disposition and may be recovered from the donee and
persons taking from him without adequate consideration and applied
to the payment of the spouse's share, as in case of his election to take
against the will.
2. Any conveyance of real estate made by a married person at any
time without the joinder or other written express assent of his spouse,
made at any time, duly acknowledged, is deemed to be in fraud of the
marital rights of his spouse (if the spouse becomes a surviving spouse)
unless the contrary is shown.
3. Any conveyance of the property of the spouse of a minor or in-
competent person is deemed not to be in fraud of the marital rights of
the minor or incompetent if the probate court authorizes the guardian
of the minor or incompetent to join in or assent to the conveyance after
finding that it is not made in fraud of the marital rights. Any convey-
ance of the property of a minor or incompetent made by a guardian
pursuant to an order of court is deemed not to be in fraud of the mari-
tal rights of the' spouse of the ward. (L. 1955 p. 385 § 251, A.L. 1957
S. B. 1)
90. Beinheimer v. Rhedans, 327 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1959).
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added in 1957, makes practicable a conveyance where the spouse is a
minor or incompetent, a former hiatus in the law.
The section has been construed only once by the Missouri Supreme
Court, which held that inchoate dower is not a vested right, and was
abolished by the Probate Code of 1955. The court also held that this
section does not create a new definition of fraud, but only affects the
burden of proof, with respect to real estate conveyances. 91 The court
further observed that since the Probate Code is silent on whether the
wife may sue during her husband's lifetime to protect her marital
rights, and since under the former law the wife could sue during the
husband's lifetime to protect her inchoate dower, it is to be assumed
that there is no limitation as to the time to sue, so as to make an action
brought during lifetime premature. The court found that there was
consideration for the husband's deed and that its purpose was not to
defraud the wife of her marital rights.
Paragraph 1 of section 474.150 confirms the right of one spouse to
set aside a fraudulent transfer by the other, and spells out the type
of relief to which the plaintiff spouse will be entitled. It is still
necessary, under the cases, to show that the transfer was made either
in immediate anticipation of a coming marriage or during the mar-
riage, in contemplation of impending death, for the purpose of de-
priving and defrauding the other spouse of his or her marital rights.
The transfer must include a substantial part of the transferor's
property, and be made without adequate consideration.
In 1959, the 70th General Assembly passed a statute92 which pro-
vided for conveyance of real estate held by the entirety when one of
the spouses is an incompetent or a minor. This new statute fills an
important gap, in the third paragraph of section 474.150, because
formerly there was no way by which the entirety property could be
conveyed, when one spouse was incompetent, although, as a matter of
practice, interests of incompetent spouses in entirety property have
been passed on deeds by the guardian of such incompetent spouse
(other than the other spouse), where the entire proceeds of the sale
have been placed in the guardianship estate. If the incompetent spouse
was the husband, this presented no particular hardship, because the
wife could obtain support from the estate. If the incompetent spouse
was the wife, however, this often created an undue hardship, particu-
larly where the couple was elderly, because often the husband was
dependent upon the proceeds of the sale to secure other living quar-
ters, or for his own or his wife's support. The husband was not per-
mitted to receive support from the guardianship estate of his
91. Id. at 828.
92. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 442.035 (Vernon's Supp. 1960).
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incompetent wife, so long as he had funds of his own, and no authority
existed whereby the funds could be used to purchase a new home by
the entirety.
IV. MARITAL RIGHTS AND MISSOURI INHERITANCE TAX
Exempt property" and family allowance" are allowable as deduc-
tions in determining the net probate estate, but homestead allowances-
is not.
Initially a question existed as to whether a spouse's distributive
share, if she elected to take under the will, 98 was exempt from tax
under the old statute.97 The latter section, prior to the amendment,
allowed the spouse an exemption of $20,000, "in addition to an amount
equal' to the aggregate value of such marital rights to which . ..
[the surviving spouse] would have been entitled if ... [he or she]
had renounced said will or if [the deceased] spouse had died intestate.
Ilse
A spouse who elects to take against the will' 9 takes by descent
exactly as if her spouse had died intestate.100 The supreme court has
held that the legislature, by changing the basis of taking from
statutory marital rights, under the old law, to descent, under the new
Code, did not intend to do away with the exemption as to the marital
rights distributive share.201
The amended statute2oz removes all such question entirely, and also
avoids a possible inequity between electing spouses, where there are
children as opposed to cases where there are no children.
The other principal development having a practical bearing on
marital rights is found in two recent cases dealing with taxability of
joint tenancies. While this is not restricted to husband and wife situa-
tions, joint tenancies are more common in such cases, and the deci-
sions, therefore, are significant, especially in estate planning.
It is completely settled that under the present inheritance tax
statutes, joint tenancies are not subject to tax, regardless of when
created, or the motive of creation203
93, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.250 (Supp. 1957).
94, Mo. Rev Stat. § 474,260 (Supp. 1957).
95. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.290 (Supp. 1957).
96. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
97. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 145.090 (1949).
98. Ibid.
99. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.160 (Supp. 1957).
100. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 474.010 (Supp. 1957).
101. In re Atkins' Estate, 307 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. 1957).
102. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 145.090 (Supp. 1957).
103. Osterloh's Estate v. Carpenter, 327 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1960); In re
Gerling's Estate, 303 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1957).
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In summary, the state of the law dealing with marital rights is
reasonably clear for the present-day practitioner. Many of the former
uncertainties have been removed by the statutory provisions of our
Probate Code, enacted in 1955, and by the clarifying amendments
since adopted. The task of the lawyer thereby has been made a little
less difficult.
Washington University Open Scholarship
CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
RONALD GOLDFAB-B.A. 1954, Syracuse University; LL.B. 1956,
Syracuse University Law School; LL.M. 1960, Yale Law School.
Arthur Garfield Hays Fellow, New York University Law% School.
Member, New York and California Bar Associations.
DONALD H. GoRDoN-Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State
University School of Law, Detroit, Michigan. A.B. 1946, Princeton
University; LL.B. 1948, LL.M. 1957, Harvard Law School. Practiced
law in Boston, Massachusetts, 1949-1956. Member, Massachusetts
and Michigan Bar Associations.
DAVID Y. CAMPBELL-Partner, Stamm, Millar, Neuhoff & Campbell,
St. Louis, Missouri. LL.B. 1932, Washington University School of
Law. Member, Probate and Procedure Committee, Bar Association of




Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
Volume 1961 February, 1961 Number 1
Edited by the Undergraduates of Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.
Published in February, April, June, and December at
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
EDITORIAL BOARD
























WILLIAM M. WARD, JE.
FACULTY ADVISOR
WILLIAM C. JONES
BUSINESS STAFF: BURTON FNDELMAN, PHILLIP A. WSMER, LOUIS SUSMAN
ADVISORY BOARD



























A. E. S. SCHMID
EDWIN M. SCHAEFER, Ji.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS
KARL P. SPENCER
MAURICE L. Smw A2
JOHN R. STOCZHA-
WATN B. WRIGHT
Subscription Price $4.00; Per Single Copy $1.25. A subscriber desiring to
discontinue his subscription should send notice to that effect. In the absence of
such notice, the subscription will be continued.
Washington University Open Scholarship
